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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to section 78-2-3(2)(a) of the Utah Code, giving it
appellate jurisdiction over the final Orders and Decrees
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies.
This action is an appeal from an Order issued by the Utah
Department of Health following a formal hearing.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW
ISSUES PRESENTED
The following are at issue in this Appeal:
1.

Did the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health

Care Financing erroneously apply the law in ruling that Shawnta
Herrera was not a resident of the State of Utah between December
7, 1991 and February 1, 1991?
2.

Did the Department of Health, Division of Health Care

Financing, erroneously apply the law when it determined that
Shawnta Herrera was not entitled to Medicaid benefits during the
period stated above?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review in this proceeding is set forth in
Section 63-46b-16(4) of the Utah Code.

It provides:

The appellate court should grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:

3
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(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face
or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all the issues requiring
resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied
the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure
decision-making process or has failed to follow prescribed
procedure;
(f) the persons taking agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the
agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to the rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice,
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving
facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational
basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
In addressing the issues presented, this court is not bound
by the determination of the Department of Health.

Addressing the

statute just cited, particularly subpart (d), Utah appellate
courts have held that "an agency's statutory construction should
only be given deference when there is a grant of discretion to
the agency concerning the language in question."

International,

Inc.

1991); see also

v. Auditing

Mor-Flo

Division,

Industries

Morton

814 P.2d 581 (Utah

v. Board of Review,

817 P.2d

328 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
This case involves the application of facts to the
regulatory definition of resident.

As such, it is a question of

application of the law, suitable for the correction of error
4
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standard.

Morton International,

Inc.,

814 P.2d at 586-89.

Further, there is no grant of discretion to the agency regarding
application of the term.

As will be discussed below, federal law

requires that certain benefits be available to all eligible
residents of a state.

The term "resident" has been defined in

detail by the United States Department of Health and Human
Services.

See 42 C.F.R. § 435.403, thus removing any agency

discretion.

In fact, as states have attempted to alter or

interpret residency in an alternative fashion, the Department of
Health and Human Services has amended the rule to clarify its
intent and meaning.

See, e.g., 49 Fed. Reg. 1352 6-31. Hence,

the Department of Health is not entitled to discretion in its
application.
Neither does the decision of the Department of Health
deserve deference because of its expertise.

Courts have always

been empowered to address residency laws, putting this court in
just as good a position as the agency to make the determination.
Thus, in applying the findings of fact in this matter to the
law, the court is entitled to apply a correction of error
standard and ignore the decision of the Department of Health.

It

may "decide that the agency has erroneously interpreted the law
if the court merely disagrees with the agency's interpretation."
Morton,
State

814 P.2d at 587 (quoting Savage

Industries,

Inc.

Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991).
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v.

Utah

CONTROLLING LAW
Rule R414-1-17 of the Utah Administrative Code provides:
Medicaid is furnished to eligible individuals who are
residents of the State under 42 C.F.R. § 435.403. (The
addendum includes 42 C.F.R. § 435.403 in its entirety.)
Section 435.403(m) of 42 C.F.R. provides:

Cases

of disputed

residency.

Where two or more States

cannot resolve which State is the State of residence, the
State where the individual is physically located is the
State of residence.
Section 233.40 of 45 C.F.R. provides:
(a) Condition
for Plan Approval.
A State plan under title
I, IV-A, X, XIV, or XVI of the Social Security Act may not
impose any residence requirement which excludes any
individual who is a resident of the State except as provided
in paragraph (b) of this section. For purposes of this
section:
(1) A resident of a State is one: (i) Who is living in
the State voluntarily with the intention of making his or
her home there and not for a temporary purpose. A child is
the resident of the State in which he or she is living other
than on a temporary basis. Residence may not depend upon
the reason for which the individual entered the State,
except insofar as it may bear upon whether the individual is
there voluntarily or for a temporary purpose; or
(ii) Who, in living in the State, is not receiving
assistance from another State, and entered the State with a
job commitment or seeking employment in the State (whether
or not currently employed). Under this definition, the
child is a resident of the State in which the caretaker is a
resident.
(2) Residence is retained until abandoned. Temporary
absence from the State, with subsequent returns to the
State, or intent to return when the purposes of the absence
have been accomplished, does not interrupt continuity of
residence.
(b) Exception.
A State plan under title I, X, XIV or XVI
need not include an individual who has been absent from the
State for a period in excess of 90 consecutive days
(regardless of whether the individual has maintained his or
her residence in the State during this period) until he or
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she has been present in the State for a period of 3 0
consecutive days (or a shorter period specified by the
State) in the case of such individual who has maintained
residence in the State during such period of absence or for
a period of 90 consecutive days (or a shorter period as
specified by the State) in the case of any other such
individual. An individual thus excluded under any such plan
may not, as a consequence of that exclusion, be excluded
from assistance under the State's Title XIX plan if
otherwise eligible under the Title XIX Plan (see 42 C.F.R. §
436.403),

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Order of the Utah Department of
Health, Division of Health Care Financing which denied Medicaid
benefits to an infant.

The infant was born in December 199 0 in

Murray, Utah and was hospitalized from that date through April
1991.

Although the Department of Health paid Medicaid benefits

for the infant between February and April 1991, it denied
benefits for the months of December 1990 and January 1991 on the
grounds that the infant was not a resident of the state of Utah
but of Arizona.

The Arizona Physicians IPA, Inc., Arizonafs

Medicaid administrator, also refused to pay benefits during this
period, which decision was affirmed by the Arizona Health Care
Cost Containment System following a hearing (Appellate Record at
Exhibits, hereinafter "R. at

").

Primary Children's Medical Center, who provided medical care
to the infant, requested, on her behalf, a hearing addressing the
denied benefits before the Utah Department of Health (R. at 1-2).
That resulted in an Order from the Department of Health ruling
that the infant was ineligible for Medicaid

because she was not

7
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a resident of Utah (R. at 69-77).

The Order was affirmed in

Response to a Request for Reconsideration (R. at 83-91).
Following that ruling, this appeal was filed (R. at 92-93).

STATEMENT OP FACTS
In October 1990, Norma Molina came to Utah from Arizona.
She owned no property in Arizona, nor did she leave an apartment
in her own name.

Upon her arrival in Utah, she stayed with

friends and family.

(Agency Findings of Fact, R. at 72-73).

On December 6, 1990, Norma Molina gave birth to a baby girl,
Shawnta Herrera, at Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center in Murray,
Utah.

(Agency Findings of Fact, R. at 72-73).

Because Shawnta

was born prematurely, she was transferred to Primary Children's
Hospital the next day, where she remained hospitalized until
April 1991.

(Agency Findings of Fact, R. at 72-73) .

Ms. Molina resided continuously in Utah after October 1990
(Agency Findings of Fact, R. at 72-73).

She applied for prenatal

benefits in that month, and was deemed eligible for such benefits
through Shawnta's birth.

(R. at Exhibits).

She applied for

Medicaid assistance in December 1990 and again in March 1991,
(Response to Request for Reconsideration, R. at 83-91).

When

making those applications, she expressed her intent to make her
home in Utah.

(Request for Reconsideration, R. at 80).

Between January 9, 1991 and March 8, 1991, Ms. Molina was
employed by Northwest Textiles in Midvale, Utah.

(Agency

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Findings of Fact, R. at 72-73; Letter from Anna Navarrate, R. at
Exhibits).
According to the notes of representatives of the Department
of Health, during the months of December 1990 and January 1991,
Ms. Molina, despite her residency in Utah, did not surrender her
rights to certain benefits from Arizona, nor did she notify
Arizona authorities of her Utah residence (Response to Request
for Reconsideration, Exhibits, R. at 83-91) . She allegedly
received AFDC support in these months, although it is unclear how
it was delivered to her.

(Response to Request for

Reconsideration, Exhibits, R. at 83-91; Transcript of Hearing, R.
at 29). When Ms. Molina spoke with representatives of Primary
Children's Medical Center in December 1990, however, she stated
that she had no means of paying for medical services rendered.
(Transcript of Hearing, R. at 30-31).
Ms. Molina on January 31, 1991.

Arizona closed its file on

(Response to Request for

Reconsideration, Exhibits, R. at 83-91).
After learning that Norma Molina was living in Utah, APIPA,
the Arizona Medicaid administrator, refused to pay Shawnta's
medical expenses for December 1990 and January 1991.
Exhibits).

(R. at

In justifying denial of the claim, the Director of

the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System stated that (1)
APIPA was not properly notified of the care at Primary Children's
Medical Center, and (2) "testimony and the records support the
contention that the patient was not a resident of the state of
Arizona."

(Decision, R. at Exhibits).

He ordered a reevaluation

•9
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of Ms. Molina's eligibility for AFDC and Medicaid benefits, (R.
at Exhibits), and since that time, Arizona authorities have
refused to pay any of Shawnta's medical expenses for this period.
(Letter from Leonard J. Kirschner, R. at 82).
In March 1991, the Utah Department of Health, Division of
Health Care Financing approved Ms. Molina's application for
Medicaid benefits retroactive to February 1, 1991.
Findings of Fact, R. at 72-73).

(Agency

Shawnta Herrera's medical

expenses incurred at Primary Children's Medical Center from that
date forward were paid by the Department of Health, Division of
Health Care Financing (Transcript of Hearing, R. at 61). The
expenses for December 1990 and January 1991 have not been paid,
despite the residency of Ms. Molina and Shawnta in Utah
(Transcript of Hearing, R. at 38).
Shawnta Herrera moved to Arizona with her mother in June
1991.

(Transcript of Hearing, R. at 47).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At its essence, this claim involves a disagreement between
Utah and Arizona as to who should provide Medicaid benefits for
an infant, the petitioner Shawnta Herrera.

The Utah Department

of Health takes the position that Shawnta and her mother were not
residents of Utah, citing a future intent to return to the
mother's previous state of residence, Arizona.

Arizona

authorities, on the other hand, claim that the mother's extended
presence in Utah, without leaving a home in Arizona, make Shawnta
10
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a resident of Utah.

In the middle of this dispute, the infant,

her mother and health care providers are left with significant
medical expenses.
In outlining the regulatory framework for Medicaid, federal
authorities anticipated such disputes.
adopted a regulation to govern them.

For this reason, they

In the case of a dispute,

residency is determined according to physical presence.

Because

Shawnta was physically in the State of Utah, she is deemed a Utah
resident for Medicaid purposes.

Hence, she is entitled to any

benefits from Utah for which she is eligible.
Furthermore, Shawnta was in fact a resident of Utah.
Federal Regulations governing Medicaid benefits define residence
according to physical presence other than on a temporary basis.
Viewed in light of existing legal authority concerning residency,
this signifies presence in a locale coupled with an intent to
remain there for an indefinite time.
When Norma Molina came to Utah, she intended to remain for
an indefinite time.

She left no home or apartment in Arizona,

and although she intended to return at some time, the date of and
place for that return was uncertain.

One and one-half months

after arriving in Utah, she gave birth to Shawnta Herrera, who
was hospitalized for the first four and one-half months of her
life.

Although Ms. Molina might have returned to Arizona for a

time during these months, she did not.

Even after Shawntafs

discharge from the Hospital, Ms. Molina continued to reside in
Utah, staying through June 1991.
11
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While in Utah, Norma Molina took a job, applied for medical
and welfare benefits, and otherwise made Utah the center of her
life.

In so doing, on at least one occasion she expressed her

specific intent to make her home in Utah.

Although she

maintained some future intent to return to Arizona, during the
period at dispute herein, her intent was to remain in Utah for an
indefinite period.

As such, she was a resident of Utah and her

daughter is entitled to Medicaid benefits.

ARGUMENT
This Appeal involves a dispute as to residency.

Following

her premature birth in Murray, Utah on December 6, 1990, Shawnta
Herrera was hospitalized for the first four and one-half months
of her life.

Despite her apparent eligibility for Medicaid

benefits, which were paid for February, March and April of 1991,
The Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing
("Department of Health"), denied those benefits for December 1990
and January 1991 on the grounds that Shawnta was not a resident
of Utah.

Arizona, the site designated by the Department of

Health as Shawntafs State of Residence during those months, did
the same.

As a consequence, the medical expenses incurred by

Shawnta at Primary Childrenfs Medical Center remain unpaid.

For

this reason, Shawnta appeals the denial of those benefits by the
Department of Health.
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I.

BECAUSE UTAH AND ARIZONA CANNOT RESOLVE THE DISPUTE AS TO
HER RESIDENCY, SHAWNTA HERRERA MUST BE CONSIDERED A RESIDENT
OP THE STATE OP UTAH.

A.

Federal Law Requires States to Provide Medicaid Benefits to
All Eligible Residents and Allows Every Individual to Have a
Residence for the Purpose of Such Benefits,
To obtain federal assistance for its Medicaid program, the

Department of Health had to adopt a plan meeting statutory and
regulatory requirements, as well as receiving the approval of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS").
See generally

42 U.S.C. § 1396a et seq.

Among the requirements

is the condition that a "plan may not contain any residence
requirement which excludes any individual who resides in the
state," even if that person has no fixed address.
1396a(b).

42 U.S.C. §

Thus, the Medicaid plan for Utah cannot be interpreted

to deny benefits to an otherwise eligible resident of the state.
To determine who is a resident to in order to qualify for
Medicaid benefits, the Utah plan incorporates the regulations
promulgated by HHS. Utah Admin. Code R414-1-17 (1992)
(incorporating 42 C.F.R. § 435.403).

As HHS has amended these

regulations since their inception, it has made clear its intent
to allow every eligible1 individual access to Medicaid benefits.
Thus, HHS supported certain changes by stating that the purpose
of the rule is:
to permit uniform application and to insure that no
otherwise eligible individual is denied Medicaid because no
1

Eligibility, in this context, refers not to residency but
to factors relating to income and disability which determine who
is entitled to Medicaid benefits. See generally
42 U.S.C. §
1396a.
13
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state recognizes him as a resident .... We want to insure
that no individual finds himself without any state of
residence for Medicaid purposes or is denied his
Constitutional rights to travel freely among states.
Summary, Supplementary Information, 44 Fed. Reg. 41434 (1979);
see also

Supplementary Information, 49 Fed. Reg. 13527 (1984).

Given this language, there can be no question that Shawnta
Herrera is entitled to residency in some state for the purpose of
obtaining Medicaid benefits.
The regulatory section governing residence, 42 C.F.R. §
435.403, provides numerous rules to determine the residency of
persons in distinct situations.

Shawnta!s residency, for

instance, is determined according to a separate regulation
governing residence under AFDC programs.
435.403(h)(3).

42 C.F.R. §

It provides that "A child is a resident of the

state in which he or she is living other than on a temporary
basis."

45 C.F.R. § 233.40(j)(1).

Other sections clarify the

state of residence where a person might be considered a resident
of either of two states. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.403(h)(4)
(residence of institutionalized minors).

Of particular

importance for this case is the rule dealing with disputed
residency, a "tie breaker" provision.

It provides: "Where two or

more states cannot resolve which State is the State of residence,
the state where the individual is physically located is the state
of residence."

42 C.F.R. § 435.403(m).

Thus, when states are

unable to resolve the question of residency, physical presence
becomes the determining factor.

14
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B.

As Utah and Arizona Cannot Resolve Shawnta Herrera's
Residence During December 1990 and January 1991, She was a
Resident of Utah, the State where She was Physically
Present.
In this case, both Arizona and Utah have refused to provide

Medicaid payments for December 1990 and January 1991. Although
the Department of Health paid benefits between February and April
1991, it denied those benefits for December 1990 and January 1991
on the grounds that Shawnta was not a resident of Utah, but of
Arizona.

Similarly, Arizona refused to pay medicaid such

benefits for this period, in part because "the patient was not a
resident of the state of Arizona at the time services were
provided."

Challenges to the denial of benefits in each state

were unsuccessful and negotiations between the states upon
Request for Reconsideration in Utah proved fruitless. When
Arizona refused to pay, Utah did the same.
Hence, this matter obviously involves a dispute in which
"two or more states cannot resolve which State is the State of
residence."

As such, "the State where the individual is

physically located is the State of Residence."

Without dispute,

Shawnta Herrera and her mother were physically present in Utah
during December 1990 and January 1991. Therefore, Utah is the
State of Residence.

Shawnta is entitled to medicaid benefits in

Utah for those months.
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II.

SHAWNTA HERRERA WAS A IN FACT A RESIDENT OF UTAH IN DECEMBER
1990 AND JANUARY 1991, AND THEREFORE ENTITLED TO MEDICAID
BENEFITS DURING THAT TIME.
As noted above, Shawnta Herrera should be considered a

resident of Utah during December 1990 and January 1991 based on
the dispute between Utah and Arizona and her physical presence in
Utah.

Aside from that determination, however, Shawnta also

qualified as a resident of Utah under the provision defining
residency for children.

That states:

"A child is a resident of

the state in which he or she is living other than on a temporary
basis.11

45 C.F.R. § 233 .40 (j) (1) . Because Shawnta was in Utah

for an indefinite period, not on a temporary basis, she was a
resident of the state.

A.

A Resident Intends to Remain in a State For a Time or
Indefinitely.
Courts have not addressed the regulatory provision governing

Shawnta's residency.

Interpretation of that provision, however,

is aided by reference to judicial decisions relating to residency
or domicile.2

See Application

of Ruiz

v. Lavine,

49 A.D.2d 1,

Residency is a term subject to numerous interpretations,
see Ortman v. Miller,
33 Mich.App. 451, 190 N.W.2d 242, 244
(1971)(discussing various interpretations). In most cases
involving determination of residency for purposes of legal rights
and privileges, however, residency is deemed the equivalent of
the common law doctrine of domicile. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §
53B-8-102(l) (1992); Paulson v. Forest City Community
School
Dist.,
238 N.W.2d 344 (Iowa 1976).
Such is the case here, given the governing regulation's
reference to physical presence "other than on a temporary basis."
The cases addressing domicile, however, substitute "intent to
remain for an indefinite time" for the regulatory language.
Allen v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc.,
583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978).
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370 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1975)(using rules of common law domicile to
determine whether individual qualified for Medicaid).
Justice Holmes defined domicile as "the technically
preeminent headquarters that every person is compelled to have in
order that certain rights and duties that have been attached to
it by the law may be determined."
U.S. 619, 625 (1914).
Frame

v.

Residency

Williamson

v. Osenton,

232

Every person must have a domicile, See

Appeals

Committee,

675 P.2d 1157, 1168 (Utah

1983)(Howe, J. dissenting), which is usually a person's home,
"where a person dwells and which is the center of his domestic,
social and civil life." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§§ 11-12.

Where an individual resides is presumed to be her

domicile.

See District

of

Columbia

v.

Murphy,

314 U.S. 441, 455

(1941).
Along with physical presence, the critical element in
determining an individual's residence or domicile is intent.

The

Restatement states: "To acquire a domicil ... a person must
intend to make that place his home for a time at least."
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 18; Frame,
1168 (Howe, J. dissenting); Hawes v. Club

598 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1979).

Ecuestre

El

675 P.2d at
Comandante,

Courts addressing the same concept

have emphasized that the individual must intend to remain for an
"indefinite" time, Allen,

583 P.2d at 615, Lloyd

v. Babb,

296

N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979), looking specifically at whether
an individual has a present intention to reside elsewhere.
Williamson

v. Osenton,

232 U.S. 619 (1914).

In this case,
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therefore, the key is whether Shawnta and her mother intended to
reside in Utah for an indefinite time.

B.

Shawnta Herrera was a Resident of Utah Because She Intended
to Remain for an Indefinite Time.
In this case, the expressions and actions of Shawnta's

mother demonstrate that Shawnta was not in Utah for a temporary
purpose, but that she was living in Utah indefinitely.3

Norma

Molina came to Utah from Arizona in October 1990. Although she
stayed with friends and family, obtaining no home or apartment of
her own, she neither left real estate or an apartment in her name
in Arizona.

Shortly after arrival, she applied for prenatal

benefits through the Department of Health, for which she was
classified as eligible.
After Norma Molina had been in Utah for a month and a half,
longer than a typical vacation or visit, she delivered Shawnta.
As was noted above, Shawnta was hospitalized until she was four
and one-half months old.
to return to Arizona.

During this time, Ms. Molina was free

Instead, however, she remained in Utah,

taking employment with a Utah firm4 and working during several
3

The domicile of a child is that of its parent, Oleen v.
Oleen, 15 Utah 2d 326, 392 P.2d 792, 794 (1964), and the domicile
a child born out of wedlock, as was Shawnta, is that if its
mother, Application
of Morse, 1 Utah 2d 312, 324 P.2d 773 (1958).
Thus, the determination of whether Shawnta was in Utah for a
temporary purpose hinges on her mother's intent.
According to the Assistance Payment Administration Manual
III-F, used by the Department of Health to determine residency,
Utah residency can be demonstrated by verification of employment
in the state. See APA, Volume IIIF, Table VIII, Examples of
Acceptable Verifications, included in addendum. Further, persons
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months that Shawnta was hospitalized.

She also made application

for Utah Medicaid benefits, both in December 1990 and again in
March 1991. On those applications, she expressed her intent to
make Utah her home.
In the hearing on this matter, the Department of Health
emphasized that Norma Molina intended to return to Arizona.
intent, however, is not inconsistent with Utah residency.

Such

Utah

courts have held that "A floating intention to return to a former
abode is not sufficient to prevent the new abode from becoming
one's domicile.11

Gardner

1055, 1057 (1950).

v. Gardner,

118 Utah 496, 222 P.2d

Thus, contemplation of retirement in a

location other than one's principal residence has not prevented
the establishment of domicile, Perito

v. Perito,

756 P.2d 895

(Alaska 1988), and college students have been allowed to acquire
domicile at the college, despite the fact that they intend to
move elsewhere following graduation.
65; Liberty

Mutual

363 (1975).

Ins.

Co. v.

Craddock,

Lloyd,

251 S.E.2d at 861-

26 Md.App. 296, 338 A.2d

In this case, while Norma Molina intended to return

to Arizona, she knew neither when nor where she would return.
Thus, her present intent, demonstrated by her actions, was to
remain.

The "future" or "floating" intent would not prevent her

from claiming Utah residency.

"who are employed in another state are usually not Utah residents
unless they commute regularly." APA, Volume IIIF, Glossary,
"Resident". Using this definition, Norma Molina could not be a
resident of any other state based upon her employment in Utah
between January and March 1991.
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Further, the fact that Norma Molina was in Utah for only
eight months does not prevent her from claiming Utah residence.
If the requisite intent is present, domicile can be acquired
instantly, Krasnov
instance, in Person

v. Dinan,

465 F.2d 1298 (3rd Cir. 1972),

v. Person,

For

563 N.E.2d 161 (Ind. Ct. App.

1990), a woman who had apparently reestablished her domicile in
Indiana, her childhood home, who returned to her marital home in
Illinois to attempt a reconciliation with her estranged husband,
but stayed only for a week, acquired an Illinois residency during
that time.

Id.

at 164.

In this case, Shawnta acquired Utah

residency upon arrival, in that she immediately made Utah the
center of her life's activity.
In summary, Norma Molina came to Utah with the intent of
making it her home for a time.

Upon arrival, she made it the

center of her activity, which continued for eight months. While
she considered returning to Arizona, that was not her present
intention, reflected further in the fact that she remained in
Utah more than a month after Shawnta's release from the hospital.
Given such facts, Shawnta and her mother were residents of Utah,
entitled to the benefits of such residency.

This includes

entitlement to Medicaid benefits for December 1990 and January
1991.
In arguing against this conclusion, the Department of Health
argued that Norma Molina remained eligible for and received AFDC
benefits from Arizona during December 1990 and January 1991.
Although it is unclear whether she actually received benefits,
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1

and such action would admittedly be inconsistent with Utah
residency, such conduct would be understandable in light of Ms.
Molina's situation and the behavior of each state agency.
With respect to the agencies, although Arizona allegedly
provided AFDC benefits in December and January, it denied
Medicaid payments. While that denial was based in part on
procedural defects in the claim, after a hearing on the matter,
the Director of Arizona's Cost Containment System also determined
that Shawnta was not a resident of Arizona during those months
and that Ms. Molina's eligibility should be reevaluated.

Arizona

has persisted in its refusal to pay those benefits.
In contrast, the Department of Health paid no benefits for
December and January, but did pay Medicaid and AFDC benefits to
Ms. Molina between February and June of 199l.5

Following a

hearing, however, the Department determined that those benefits

5

The Department of Health paid Medicaid benefits on
Shawnta's behalf for the months of February, March and April
1990, but denied the same for December 1990 and January 1991. At
the hearing of this matter, representatives of the Department of
Health justified the distinction by explaining that Ms. Molina
considered herself a resident of Arizona during December 1990 and
January 1991, but not thereafter (R. at 33). While the
Department based its distinction on residency, it resembles a
waiting period. Waiting periods for new residents to obtain
Medicaid benefits have been deemed unconstitutional, since they
violate equal protection because of their potential effect on
interstate travel. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
Recognizing this problem, the Utah hearing officer
recommended that Shawnta be deemed a resident of Utah from
December forward, noting that there was no significance to
February 1, 1991 (R. at 74-71). The Director also refused to
accord significance to that date, but instead held that Shawnta
was not eligible for benefits at any time, and that an
overpayment should be requested (R. at 69-77).
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were improperly paid because Ms, Molina was not a resident of
Utah.
In these circumstances, with both agencies paying benefits
which they later described as improperly paid, Norma Molina
cannot be faulted for accepting benefits from either state.

She

was on public support in Arizona and applied for the same in
Utah, suggesting dependency.

She was most likely without

sufficient understanding of the system to know of her
inconsistencies, and would reasonably have accepted a check
without asking questions or considering the legal ramifications
of acceptance.

Further, this is in no way a case where duplicate

benefits were sought, and this appeal is made only to obtain
benefits for medical care already provided to Shawnta Herrera.
Hence, the residency of Shawnta Herrera and her mother should not
revolve on benefits she may have accepted from Arizona in the
months in question.
Thus, based on their intent to remain in Utah for an
indefinite time. Shawnta Herrera and her mother should be
considered residents of Utah.

CONCLUSION
At the root of this appeal is the unwillingness of both
Arizona and Utah to provide Medicaid benefits to an infant.

The

states, thereby, seek to transfer the cost of medical care to the
infant, her mother, and the hospital.

While the States have an

interest in preserving their limited funds, in this case the
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f
refusal of the Department of Health is unjustified•

Federal

regulations specifically fix residence at the site of physical
presence where there is a dispute between states.

Thus, the

Department of Health is responsible for Shawnta's medical care.
Further, When Norma Molina came to Utah, she came for an
indefinite period.

While she intended to return to Arizona, she

knew neither when or to where she would return.

While in Utah,

she acted as a resident, making her home here, working and
otherwise making it the center of her domestic, social and civil
life.

As such, she was a resident of Utah and entitled to the

benefits of residency, including Medicaid benefits for her
daughter.
Therefore, this court should reverse the Order of the
Department of Health and Order payment of Medicaid benefits on
behalf of Shawnta Herrera for the months of December 1990 and
January 1991.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $0*

day of November, 1992.

KIRTON, McCONKIE & PpELMAN

yffpp
DaviQ B. Ek-icks^h
David J. HSrdy/
Attorneys for^Tetitioner
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42 CFR Ch. IV (10-1-91 Edition)

§ 435.322
cover the medically needy, it may provide Medicaid to Individuals who—
(a) Are 65 years of age and older, as
specified In 5 435.520; and
(b) Meet the income and resource requirements of Subpart I of this part.
[46 PR 47986. Sept. 30, 1981)

1435.321 Medically needy coverage of the
disabled in States that cover individuals receiving SSI.
If the agency provides Medicaid to
ndividuals receiving SSI and elects to
over the medically needy, it may proide Medicaid to disabled individuals
yho meet—
(a) T h e requirements for disability,
5 specified in §§435.540 and 435.541;
nd
(b) T h e income and resource requirenents of Subpart I of this part.
46 FR 47986. Sept. 30, 1981; 46 FR 54743,
lov. 11. 19813

§ 435.330 Medically needy coverage of the
aged, blind, and disabled in States that
impose eligibility requirements more
restrictive than used under SSI.
(a) If an agency provides Medicaid as
categorically needy only to those aged,
blind, or disabled individuals who meet
more restrictive requirements t h a n
used under SSI and elects to cover t h e
medically needy, it may provide Medicaid as medically needy to those aged,
blind, or disabled individuals who—
(1) Are not categorically needy, as
specified in paragraph (b) of this section;
(2) Have income and resources
v/ithin
t h e standards
established
under S u b p a r t I of this part; and
(3) If applying as blind or disabled,
meet t h e blindness or disability requirements
established
under
§435.121.
(b) To determine w h e t h e r an individual Is covered as categorically needy or
medically needy, the agency must—
(1) Consider as categorically needy
those individuals who meet t h e State's
categorically needy financial standard
and—
(1) Who, before their incurred medical expenses are deducted
from
income, meet t h e financial eligibility
requirements for SSI or a S t a t e supplement; or
(ii) Whose OASDI increases are not
counted under §§ 435.134 and 435.135.
(2) Consider as medically needy all
other individuals.
(46 FR 47986. Sept. 30. 1981]

435.326 Individuals who would be ineligible if they were not enrolled in an
HMO.
If the agency provides Medicaid to
he
categorically
needy
under
435.212. it may provide Medicaid
tnder t h e same rules to medically
icedy recipients who are enrolled in a
ederally qualified HMO or in an
ntity specified in §434.20 (a)(3) and
a)(4). § 434.26(b)(3). § 434.26(b)(5)(H)
>r section 1903(m)(6) of the Act which
>rovides services as described in
i 434.21(b) of this chapter.
55 FR 23745. June 12. 1990]

§ 435.340 Protected medically needy coverage for blind and disabled individuals
eligible in December 1973.
If an agency provides Medicaid to
t h e medically needy, It must cover individuals who—
(a) Where eligible as medically
needy under t h e Medicaid plan in December 1973 on t h e basis of t h e blindness or disability criteria of t h e AB,
APTD, or AABD plan;
(b) For each consecutive m o n t h
after December 1973, continue to
meet—
(1) Those blindness or disability criteria; and

S 435.322 Medically needy coverage of the
blind in States that cover individuals
receiving SSI.
If the agency provides Medicaid to
Individuals receiving SSI and elects to
;over the medically needy. It may pro/ide Medicaid to blind individuals who
licet—
(a) The requirements for blindness,
is specified in §§435.530 and 435.531;
tnd
(b) T h e income and resource requirenents of Subpart I of this part.
46 FR 47986. Sept. 30. 1981J
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(2) T h e eligibility requirements for
the medically needy under t h e December 1973 Medicaid plan; and
(c) Meet t h e current requirements
for eligibility as medically needy
under t h e Medicaid plan except for
blindness or disability criteria.
(46 FR 47987. Sept. 30. 1981)

§ 435.403
8 135.402 | Reserved 1

fl 435.403 State residence.
(a) Requirement.
T h e agency must
provide Medicaid to eligible residents*
of t h e State, including residents who
are absent from the S t a t e . T h e conditions under which payment for services is provided to out-of-State resi§ 435.350 Coverage for certain aliens.
dents are set forth in § 431.52 of this
If an agency provides Medicaid to chapter.
the medically needy, it must provide
(b) Definition. For purposes of this
the services necessary for t h e treat- section—"Institution" has t h e same
meaning
as "Institution" and "Medical
ment of an emergency medical condition, as defined in § 440.255(c) of this institution", as defined in § 435.1009 of
this chapter. For purposes of S t a t e
chapter, to those aliens described In
placement, the term also includes
§ 435.406(c) of this subpart.
"foster care homes", licensed as set
155 FR 36819. Sept. 7, 1990)
forth in 45 CFR 1355.20, and providing
food, shelter and supportive services
to one or more persons unrelated to
Subpart E—General Eligibility
the proprietor.
Requirements
(c) Incapability of indicating
intent.
fi 435.400 Scope.
For purposes of this section, an individual
is
considered
incapable
of
indiThis subpart prescribes general requirements for determining the eligi- cating intent if the individual—
(1) Has an I.Q. of 49 or less or has a
bility of both categorically and medimental age of 7 or less, based on tests
cally needy individuals specified in
acceptable to the mental retardation
Subparts B, C, and D of this part.
agency in the State:
§ 435.401 (General rules.
(2) Is judged legally Incompetent; or
(3) Is found incapable of indicating
(a) A Medicaid agency may not intent
based on medical documentaimpose any eligibility requirement
tion obtained from a physician, psythat Is prohibited under Title X I X of
chologist,
or other person licensed by
the Act.
the S t a t e in t h e field of mental retar(b) T h e agency must base any op- dation.
tional group covered under Subparts B
(d) Who is a State resident. A resiand C of this p a r t on reasonable classi- dent
of a State is any individual who:
fications t h a t do not result In arbi(1) Meets the conditions in paratrary or inequitable t r e a t m e n t of indi- graphs
(e) through (i) of this section;
viduals and groups and t h a t are con- or
sistent with t h e objectives of Title
(2) Meets the criteria specified in an
XIX.
interstate agreement under paragraph
(c) T h e agency must not use require- (k) of this section.
ments for determining eligibility for
(e) Placement by a State in an outoptional coverage groups t h a t are—
of-State institution—(1) General rule.
(1) For families and children, more Any agency of t h e State, including an
restrictive t h a n those used under the entity recognized under S t a t e law as
State's AFDC plan; and
being under .contract with t h e S t a t e
(2) For aged, blind, and disabled in- for such purposes^ t h a t arranges for
dividuals, more restrictive, t h a n those an individual to be placed in an instiused under SSI, except for Individuals tution located in another State, is recreceiving an optional S t a t e supple- ognized as acting on behalf of t h e
ment as specified in § 435.230 or indi- S t a t e in making a placement. T h e
viduals in categories specified by the S t a t e arranging or actually making
t h e placement is considered as t h e Inagency under § 435.121.
dividual's S t a t e of residence.
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42 CFR Ch. IV (10-1-91 Edition)

§ 435.403
(2) Any action beyond providing information to the individual and the individual's family would constitute arranging or making a State placement.
However, the following actions do not
constitute State placement:
(i) Providing basic information to individuals about another State's Medicaid program, and information about
t h e availability of health care services
and facilities in another State.
(ii) Assisting an individual in locating an institution in a n o t h e r State,
provided the individual is capable of
indicating intent and independently
decides to move.
(3) When a competent individual
leaves t h e facility In which t h e individual is placed by a State, t h a t individual's State of residence for Medicaid purposes is t h e S t a t e where t h e Individual is physically located.
(4) Where a placement is initiated by
a S t a t e because t h e S t a t e lacks a sufficient number of appropriate facilities
to provide services to its residents, t h e
State making t h e placement is t h e individual's State of residence for Medicaid purposes.
(f) Individuals receiving a State supplementary payment iSSP). For individuals of any age who are receiving
an SSP, t h e State of residence is t h e
S t a t e paying t h e SSP.
(g) Individuals receiving Title IV-E
payments. For individuals of any age
who are receiving Federal payments
for foster care and adoption assistance
under title IV-E of the Social Security
Act, t h e State of residence is t h e S t a t e
where the child lives.
(h) Individuals under Age 21. (1) For
any individual who is emancipated
from his or her parents or who is mar* ried and capable of indicating intent,
the State of residence is t h e S t a t e
where the individual is living with t h e
intention to remain there permanently
or for an indefinite period.
(2) For any individual not residing in
p
an institution as defined in paragraph
)Q(b) whose Medicaid eligibility is based
on blindness or disability, the S t a t e of
residence is t h e State in which t h e individual is living.
<3) For any other non-institutional* jzed individual not subject to para^f^graph (h)(1) or (h)(2) of this section;
the State of residence is determined in-

accordance with 45 CFR 233.40, t h e
rules governing residence under t h e
AFDC program!
(4) For any institutionalized individual who is neither married nor emancipated, t h e S t a t e of residence Is—
(i) T h e parent's or legal guardian's S t a t e of residence "at t h e time of placement (if a legal guardian has been appointed and parental rights are terminated, t h e S t a t e of residence of t h e
guardian is used instead of t h e parent's); or
(ii) T h e c u r r e n t S t a t e of residence of
t h e p a r e n t or legal guardian who files
t h e application if t h e individual is institutionalized in t h a t S t a t e (if a legal
guardian has been appointed and parental rights are terminated, t h e S t a t e
or residence of t h e guardian is used instead of t h e parent's).
(iii) T h e S t a t e of residence of t h e individual or party who files an application is used if the individual has been
abandoned by his or her parent(s),
does not have a legal guardian and is
institutionalized in t h a t S t a t e .
(i) Individuals Age 21 and over. (1)
For any individual n o t residing in an
institution as defined in paragraph (b),
the S t a t e of residence is t h e S t a t e
where t h e individual is—
(i) Living with t h e intention to
remain there permanently or for an
indefinite period (or If incapable of
stating intent, where t h e individual is
living); or
(ii) Living and which t h e individual
entered with a job commitment or
seeking employment ( w h e t h e r or not
currently employed).
(2) For any institutionalized individual who became incapable of indicating intent before age 21, t h e S t a t e of
residence is—
(i) T h a t of t h e p a r e n t applying for
Medicaid on t h e individual's behalf, if
t h e parents reside in separate States
(if a legal guardian has been appointed
and parental rights are terminated,
the S t a t e of residence of t h e guardian
is used instead of t h e parent's);
(ii) T h e parent's or legal guardian's
S t a t e of residence at t h e time of placem e n t (If a legal guardian has been appointed and parental rights are terminated, t h e S t a t e of residence of the
guardian is used instead of t h e parent's); or
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§ 435.406
(iii) T h e c u r r e n t S t a t e of residence
agreements
must
contain
a
procedure
of t h e p a r e n t or legal guardian who
files t h e application if t h e individual is for providing Medicaid to individuals
institutionalized in t h a t S t a t e (If a pending resolution of t h e case. States
legal guardian has been appointed and may use interstate agreeements for
parental rights are terminated, t h e purposes other than cases of disputed
State of residence of t h e guardian is residency to facilitate administration
of the program, and to facilitate t h e
used instead of t h e parent's).
placement and adoption of title IV-E
(iv) T h e S t a t e of residence of t h e in- individuals when t h e child and his or
dividual or party who files an applica- her adoptive parent(s) move into antion is used if t h e individual has been other State.
abandoned by his or h e r parent(s),
(1) Continued Medicaid for institudoes not have a legal guardian and is
tionalized recipients. If an agency is
institutionalized in t h a t S t a t e .
providing
Medicaid to an institutional(3) For any institutionalized individual who became incapable of indicat- ized recipient who, as a result of this
ing Intent at or after age 21, the S t a t e section, would be considered a resident
of residence is t h e S t a t e in which t h e of a different State—
(1) T h e agency must continue to
Individual is physically present, except
where a n o t h e r S t a t e makes a place- provide Medicaid to t h a t recipient
from
J u n e 24, 1983 until J u l y 5. 1984,
ment.
unless it makes arrangements with an(4) For any o t h e r institutionalized
individual, t h e S t a t e of residence is other S t a t e of residence to provide
the S t a t e where t h e Individual is living Medicaid at an earlier date: and
with t h e intention to remain t h e r e
(2) Those arrangements must not inpermanently or for an indefinite clude provisions prohibited by paraperiod.
graph (h) of this section.
(m) Cases of disputed
residency.
(j) Specific prohibitions.
(1) The
agency may not deny Medicaid eligibil- Where two or more States c a n n o t reity because an individual has not re- solve which S t a t e is t h e S t a t e of resisided in t h e S t a t e for a specified dence, the S t a t e where t h e Individual'
Is physically located is t h e S t a t e of
period.
(2) T h e agency may not deny Medic- residence. *
aid eligibility to an individual In an in- [49 FR 13531. Apr. 5. 1984. as amended at 55
stitution, who satisfies t h e residency PR 48609. Nov. 21. 19901
rules set forth in this section, on t h e
grounds t h a t t h e individual did not es- § 435.404 Applicant's choice of category.
tablish residence in t h e S t a t e before
The agency must allow an individual
entering t h e institution.
who would be eligible under more
(3) T h e agency may not deny or ter- than one category to have his eligibilminate a resident's Medicaid eligibility ity determined for the category he sebecause of t h a t person's temporary ab- lects.
sence from the S t a t e if t h e person Intends to return when t h e purpose of
6 435.106 Citizenship and alienage.
the absence has been accomplished,
(a) T h e agency must provide Medicunless a n o t h e r S t a t e has determined
that the person is a resident there for aid to otherwise eligible residents of
the
United States who are—
purposes of Medicaid.
(1) Citizens; or
(k) Interstate agreements. A State
(2) Aliens lawfully admitted for permay have a written agreement with
another S t a t e setting forth rules and manent residence or permanently residing in the United States under color
procedures resolving cases of disputed of
law as defined in § 435.408 of this
residency. These agreements may es- part;
tablish criteria o t h e r t h a n those speci(3) Aliens granted lawful temporary
fied in p a r a g r a p h s (c) tftvough (i) of
this section, but must not include cri- resident status under sections 245A
and 210A of the Immigration and Nateria t h a t result in loss of residency in
tionality Act if the individual is aged,
both States or t h a t are prohibited by
blind,
or disabled as defined in section
paragraph (j) of this section. T h e
1614(a)(1) of the Act, under 18 years
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Resident (Utah Resident)

An individual who lives in Utah permanently or
indefinitely. Ususally, people who own homes in
other states are not Utah residents because their
primary place of residence is somewhere else. If a
client who owns a home in another state claims
NOT to be in Utah for a temporary purpose, that
client may be a Utah Resident if he intends to
become a Utahn. ©tents^whc^arr^mployed^fn
anotheristate^are,usually.not.Utah,jesidents unless,
theyxommute regularly?

Retroactive Month

Any of the three months immediately preceding
the initial month.

Safeguard

To protect information about clients so that
unauthorized people may not see it.

Sales Contract

A method of selling property, usually real estate.
The seller exchanges the property for a contractual
promise of a certain amount of money at specific
times. The sales contract is an asset that may or
may not be exempt.

SAVE

Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements.
This is a computerized information exchange
system that gives us information from INS to verify
citizenship status.

SAWs

Special Agricultural Workers. A group of aliens
who may be eligible for legal temporary status or
legal permanent status (amnesty) under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act.
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TABLE VIII - EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTABLE VERIFICATIONS
The act of establishing the validity and accuracy of information

Verification:

received in the process of determining eligibility of each
applicant or recipient.
This table provides EXAMPLES of acceptable verifications. The worker may use
any other reasonable method of verification as long as it provides the necessary
information to determine eligibility.

ELIGIBILITY ITEM

ACCEPTABLE VERIFICATION

U.S. RESIDENCE: AGE

(1) Birth Certificate (2) Hospital Birth Record
(3) Church Records (4) Recipient of Scoial Secruity
Benefits (5) FSA Form 125 (6) Alien Registration (7)
Naturalization Papers (8) Correspondence.from
Immigration and Naturalization service (9) Tribal
Records (10) Census Record (11) Driver's License for
I.D. only.

IDENTIFICATION

(1) Social Security Card (2) SSA form 5028

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

(1) Current Utah DL (2) Employment payroll check
stubs (3) Current USES registration (4) House
payment receipt (5) Current rent receipt showing 30
days or more (6) Utah telephone book listing
(referenced) (7) Tribal Record correspondence (8)
Children's residence usually follows that of parents
(9) MAO-patient in nursing home (30) Statement pU
-intent to remain;** Utah*

UTAH RESIDENCE

INCOME
(1) Employment payroll check stubs (2) Employer's
wage record (3) Self-employment records (4) Tribal
records correspondence (5) Copy of most recent
1040

Earned

Earned Income Deductions

(1) Check stubs showing payroll deductions or a
signed statement from employer (2) Complete
expense record for the self-employed (3) Farmer's
Home Administration Statement if self-employed
farmer.

Free Housing Provided

(1) Employer's records (2) Written agreement

Foster Care Payments

(1) Agency records
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